Watermarking is a potential method for protection of ownership rights on digital audio, image, and video data. Benchmarks are used to evaluate the performance of different watermarking algorithms. For image watermarking, the Stirmark package is the most popular benchmark, and the best currcnt algorithms pcrform well against it. However, results obtained by the Stirmark benchmark have to be handled carefully since Stirmark does not properly model the watermarking process and consequently is limitcd in its potential for impairing sophisticated image watermarking schemes. In this context, the goal of this article is threefold. First, we give an overview of the current attacking methods. Second, we describe attacks exploiting knowledge about thc statistics of the original data and the embedded watermark. We propose a stochastic formulation of estimation-based attacks. Such attacks consist of two main stages:
INTRODUCTION
Digital watermarking is a communication method in which information h is embedded directly and imperceptibly into digital data x (e.g., image, video, or audio signals), also called original data or host data, to form watermarked datay. Loosely analogous to watermarks in article documents, the embedded information is bound t o t h e watermarked data wherever it gocs. The cmbedded information should still be decodable from the watermarked data, even if the watermarked data is processed, copied, or rcdistributcd. Potential applications of digital watermarking include copyright protection, distribution tracing, authcntication, and authorized access control. Thus, the information b could be a user-ID, a serial number for a certain copy of a document, o r authentication information.
We will concentratc our analysis on the copyright protection of still images, an urgent problem for modern e-commerce. Obviously, the attacks introduced in the article can be applied t o audio and video watermarking algorithms with thc safety of generality and technical modifications depending on the physics of the considered media.
Thc watermark can be regarded as an addi-tive signal w, which contains the encoded and modulated watermark message b under constraints on the introduced perceptible distortions
given by a mask M so that J' = x + w(M).
Note that w need not be independent from the original datax. The simplest approach to achieve a perceptually indistinguishable watermarked and original signal is to kccp the power of the watcrmark signal very low. Using sophisticated psycho-acoustic o r psycho-visual models, morc appropriatc masks M can b e applied to enhance the robustness of the watermarking scheme. Commonly used embedding techniques can be classified into additive [2] , multiplicative [2] , and qiiaritizatiorz-based schemes [ 3 , 41. In additive schemes, there are usually very weak dependencies between w and x (e.g., introduced by choosing w dependent on a data-depcndent pcrceptual mask M ) . In multiplicative schemes, samples of the original data are multiplied by an independent signal v so that w = xv -x . Here, w a n d x are of course dependent on each othcr. Strong local depcndencies betwecn the rcalizations of w a n d x exist in quantization-based watermarking schemes. However, these dependencies are such that statistically x and w appear (almost) independcnt.
The term watermark itself is not always welldefined in the literature. To be precise, we have to distinguish between the watcrmark signal w, which is the actual signal added to the original data, and the watermark message or information b that is conveyed by the watermark signal. Usually the meaning is clear from context. Coding schemes can be used to achieve reliable watermark communication. In some cases only one bit needs to be communicated (on-off signaling), while in othcr cases a sequcnce of M-ary watermark symbols is transmittcd.
In most watermarking applications, t h e markcd data is likely to be processed in somc way before it rcaches the watcrmark receiver. T h e processing could be lossy compression, signal enhancement, or digital-to-analog (DiA) and analog-to-digital (AID) convcrsion. A n embedded watermark may unintcntionally or inadvertently be impaired by such processing. Other types of processing may be applied with the explicit goal of hindering watermark reception. In watermarking terminology, an uttack is any processing that may impair detection o f the watermark o r communication of the information conveyed by the watermark. The proccssed w a t e r m a r k e d d a t a is then called attacked data.
An important aspect of any Watermarking schemc is its robustncss against attacks. Thc notion of robustness is intuitively clear: A watermark is robust if it cannot be impaired without also rendering the attacked data uscless. Watermark impairment can be measured by criteria such as miss probability, probability of bit error, or channel capacity. For multimedia, the usefulness of the attacked data can be gauged by considering its perceptual quality or distortion. Hence, robustness can be evaluated by simultaneously considering watermark impairment and the distortion of the attacked data. An attack succccds in dcfeating a watcrmarking scheme if it impairs the watermark beyond acceptable limits while maintaining the perceptual quality of the attacked data.
Since thc complcte thcoretical analysis of the watermarking algorithm performance with respect to different attacks is rather complicated, the developers of watermarking algorithms refer to the results of experimental testing performed in the scope of some benchmark. The benchmark combines the possible attacks into a common framework and weights the rcsultcd performances depending on the possible application of the watermarking technology.
This article discusses several state-of-the-art attacks that dcliberatcly attempt to impair the watermark without excessively distorting the attacked data. Where possible, we take a general point of view t o highlight attack principles that can be applied in many different circumstances.
When it comes to practical examples, we usually refer to image watermarking since thc background of the authors is strongest in this application area.
First, we briefly summarizc statc-of-the-art watermarking attacks and coarscly categorize them. Next, we discuss a relatively new direction: attacks based on watermark estimation. Combining the estimated Watermark with additional noise in an optimized way can significantly improve the strength o f attacks. Finally, three different approaches for benchmarking image watermarking schemes arc prescnted.
STATE-OF-THE-ART WATE RMARKI N G ATTACKS
One categorization of the wide class of existing attacks contains four classcs or attacks: rcmoval attacks, geometric attacks, cryptographic attacks, and protocol attacks. Here, we describe coarsely these four attack types and prcsent somc examples. More dctailcd descriptions can be found in [S, 61.
REMOVAL AITACKS
Removal altucks aim at the complete removal of the watermark information from the watermarked data without cracking the security of the watermarking algorithm (e.g., without the key used for watermark embedding). That is, n o proccssing, even prohibitively complcx, can recover the watermark information from the attacked data. This category includes denoising, quantization (e.g., for compression), rcmodulation, and collusion attacks. Not all of these mcthods always come close to their goal of complete watermark removal, but they may nevertheless damage t h e watcrmark information significantly.
Sophisticated removal attacks try to optimize operations like deiioising or quantization to impair the embcdded watermark as much as possible while keeping t h e quality of t h e attacked document high enough. Usually, statistical models for the watermark and thc original data are cxploited within the optimization process.
Collusion 
PROTOCOL ATTACKS
Protocol attacks aim at attacking the entire concept of the watermarking application. One type of protocol attack is bascd on the concept of invertihle watermarks [7] . The idea behind inversion is that the attacker subtracts his own watermark from the watermarked data and claims to be the owner of the watermarked data. This can create ambiguity with respect to the true ownership of the data. It has been shown that for copyright protection applications, watermarks need to be noninvertible. The requirement of noninvertibility of the watermarking technology implics that it should not be possible to extract a watermark from a non-watermarked document. A solution to this problem might be t o make watermarks signal-dependent by using one-way functions.
Another protocol attack is the copy attack. I n this case, t h e goal is n o t t o destroy t h e watermark or impair its detection, but to estimate a watermark from watcrmarked data and copy it to somc other data, called target data [SI. The estimatcd watermark is adaptcd to the local features of the target data to satisfy its imperceptibility. The copy attack is applicable when a valid watermark in the target data can be produced with neither algorithmic knowledge of t h e watcrmarking technology n o r knowledge of the watermarking key. Again, signal-dependent watermarks might b e resistant to thc copy attack. or different watermark, can be obtained by an attacker or a group of attackers. In such a case, a successful attack can be achieved by averaging all copies or taking only small parts from each differcnt copy. Recent results show that a small number of different copies (e.g., about 10) in the hands of one attacker can lead to successful watermark removal.
G EO M ETR I c AITACKS
In contrast to removal attacks, geometric attacks do not actually remove the embedded watermark itself, but intend to distort the watermark detector synchronization with the embedded information. T h e detector could recover the embedded watermark information when perfect synchronization is regained. However, the coinplexity of the required synchronization process might be too great to bc practical.
For image watermarking, the best known benchmarking tools, Unzign and Stirmark [ 11, integrate a variety of geometric attacks. Unzign introduces local pixel jittering and is very efficient in attacking spatial domain watermarking schemes. Stirmark introduces both global and local geometric distortions. We give a fcw more details about these attacks later in this article. However, most recent watermarking methods survive these attacks due to the use o€ special synchronization techniques. Robustness to global geometric distortions often relies on the use of either a transform-invariant domain (FourierMelline) or an additional template, or specially designed periodic watermarks whose autocovariance function (ACF) allows estimation of the geometric distortions. However, as discussed below, the attacker can design dedicated attacks exploiting knowledge of the synchronization scheme.
Robustness to global affine transformations is more or less a solved issue. However, resistance to the local random alterations integrated in Stirmark still remains an open problem for most commercial watermarking tools. The so-called random bending attack in Stirmark exploits the fact that the human visual system (HVS) is not sensitive to local shifts and affine modifications. Therefore, pixcls are locally shifted, scaled, and rotated without significant visual distortion. However, it is worth noting that some recent methods are able to resist this attack.
ESTIMATION-BASED ATTACKS
Here, we consider attacks that take into account the knowledge of watermarking technology and exploit statistics of the original data and watermark signal [5, . In addition, we emphasize that for the design of attacks against watermarking schemes, the distortion of the attacked document and the success of watermark impairment has to he considered. Within the scopc of these attacks, we present the concept of estimalionhased attucks. This concept is bascd o n t h e assumption that thc original data or the watermark can be estimated -at least partiallyfrom the watermarked data using somc prior knowledge of the signals' statistics. Note that estimation does not require any knowledge of the key used for watermark embedding. Furthermore, knowledge of the embedding rule is not required, but the attack can be more succcssful with it.
Depending on thc final purpose of the attack,
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~ the attacker can obtain an estimate of the original data or of the watermark based on some stochastic criteria such as maximum likelihood (ML), maximum a posteriori probability (MAP), or minimum mean square error (MMSE). We do not focus here on thc particularities of the above estimation but rather concentrate on different ways to exploit the obtained estimates to impair the embedded watermark. Depending on the way the estimate is used, we can classify estimation-based attacks as removal, protocol, or desynchronization attacks.
ESTIMATE OF THE ORIGINAL DATA
Considering the watermark as noise in the watermarked data, the attacker can try to estimate the original unwatermarked data. This attack results in the design of an optimal denoising scheme. Taking into account the results of recent investigation that established the strong connection between denoising and compression for filtering of additive noise from the images, this means in the case of image watcrmarks that the attacker can easily apply the most recent advanced coders based on wavelet decomposition to remove the watermark. Keeping in mind the design of such coders in terms of an optimal rate-distortion trade-off, the attacker can obtain a considerable gain in resolving the compromise between distortions introduced by the attack and success in removal of the watermark. Note that in both denoising and optimized compression, both the perceptual and objective quality of the attacked image can be improved significantly. We classiQ both denoising and optimized compression as removal attacks.
REMODULATION ATTACKS
Remodulation attacks aim at modification of the watermark using modulation opposite to that used for watcrmark embedding. Assuming the estimated watermark is correlated with the actual watermark, meaning a good estimate could be obtained, the cstimatcd watermark can be subtracted from the watermarked data. Subtracting a very inaccurate estimate of the watermark might decrease the document quality without affecting the watermark too much. On the other hand, correlation-based detection can be defeated by subtracting an amplified version of the estimated watermark. For this reason, we introduccd a gain factor y 2 1, which gives us the possibility to trade off the distortion of the attacked document vs. the success of the attack. T h e r e a r e f o u r basic variations of t h e remodulation attack. First, when y = 1, the attack yields the MMSEiMAP estimate of the original and reduces to the denoising attack. Second, for y > 1, the quality of the attacked document might be reduced, but correlationbased detection might be defeated more successfully. T h e attack can even drive t h e correlation to zero so that the detector incorrectly decides that the watermark is not present in the attacked data. Third, whcn using a morc sophisticated distortion measure than simple MSE, a better compromise between success of the attack and i n t r o d u c e d distortion can be obtained by weighting the remodulated watermark by a perceptual mask. Fourth, the attacker can not only subtract the weighted, estimated watermark, but also add outliers to obtain a non-Gaussian noise distribution, which decreases the performance of correlation-based detection. Moreover, exploiting f e a t u r e s of t h e human perceptual system, the attacker can efficiently embed a large amount of outliers in perceptually less significant parts of the data. For image data, this approach has been demonstrated to be successful in [9] . We rcfer to this attack as perceptual remodulation (Fig. 1) .
COPV AITACK
The estimated watermark can be exploited to implement a copy attack, as already described. Of course, the copied watermark has to be adapted to the target data to keep the quality of the falsely watcrmarkcd target data high enough. There are many practical ways to adapt the watcrmark to the target data based on perceptual models. For images, contrast sensitivity and texture masking phenomena of the HVS can be exploited. The estimation-bascd copy attack is most successful when the same perceptual model is used as in the original watermarking algorithm.
Note that the copy attack in its described version is mainly applicable to additive watcrmarking schemes. In the case of quantization-based watermarking schemes, even a perfectly estimated watermark signal w cannot be copied since it is highly unlikely that the copied signal w is a valid watermark in the target signal (Fig. 2) .
SYNCHRONIZATION REMOVAL
Watermark estimation can also be very efficiently applied to attack synchronization mechanisms. The basic idea of synclzronization removul is to detect synchronization pattcrns, remove thcm, and then apply desynchronization techniques, such as global affine transformation in the case of image watermarking.
Here, we concentrate on synchronization methods for image watermarking based o n a tcmplate in thc magnitude image spectrum or on the ACF of periodic watermarks. In both cases, peaks a r e g e n e r a t e d in t h e F o u r i e r domain [S, 91. It is obvious that such peaks can easily be detected. Once the peaks have been dctccted, the next step of the attack is to interpolate the spectrum of the watermarked image or previously attacked image in the locations of spatial frequencies determined by a local peak detector. The gencralizcd block diagram of this attack is shown in Figure 3 , whcre 3 and 3-' denote direct and inverse Fourier transforms, respectively, 1. I is the magnitude, and arg is the phase.
COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST ESTIMATION -BAS E D ATTACKS
To resist estimation-based attacks, the embedder aims at making the watermark difficult to cstimate. This approach has been investigated for two different scenarios.
Power-Spectrum Condition -An idealized theoretical approach [lo] for analyzing estimation-based attacks treats the original signal and watcrmark as independent, zero-mean, stationary, colored Gaussian random processes. T h e watermarked data is the sum of these two processes. Since the original signal is given, its power spectrum is assumed to be fixed, but the watermark power spectrum can be varied. The qucstion is, how should the watermark power spectrum be shaped to rcsist an estimation-based attack'! For this scenario, the optimal estimatc is obtained by a Wiener filter. Thc MSE E between the original watermark and the estimated watermark provides a convenient way to measurc how well a watcrmark resists estimation. I t can b e shown that E is maximized if and only if the watermark powcr spectrum is directly proportional to the powcr spectrum of the original signal. This requirement is called the power-spectrum condition (PSC). A watermark whose power spectrum satisfies the PSC is the most resistant against estimation.
If distortion is measured by the mean squared difference between the attacked data and thc unwatermarked original data, the PSC has another important consequence: For any output of the matched filter, a watermark that fulfills thc PSC causes the above attack to incur thc greatest distortion. To drive the correlation to zero, the attack must make the distortion as large as the power of the original data, so the attacked data is unlikely to be useful.
Noise Visibility Function -T h e PSC is attractive because it can be proven rigorously and has a convenient mathematical form. For image watermarking, image denoising provides a natural way to develop estimation-based attacks [13] optimizcd for the statistics of images, although optimality might bc difficult to prove. The Watermarked image is treated as a noisy version of the original image, and the watermark represents noise that should be eliminated. Thus, the estimated watcrmark is the same as the estimated noise.
We applied different statistical models for the original images, namely a nonstationary Caussian process or a stationary, generalized Gaussian process. The noiseiwatermark can be treated as o n e of these processcs; howevcr, hcre we assume that it is still a stationary Gaussian process. In the first case, the dcnoising method uses an adaptive Wiener filter, while in the second it reduces to the popular denoising methods of hard-thresholding and soft-shrinkage as particular cascs.
Both denoising methods produce a Iexture masking function (TMF), which is derived from the imagc statistics and is therefore imagcdependent. The T M F takes on values in [0,1]. To embed a watcrmark that rcsists such estimation, the watermark cmbedding should use the inverted function known as a noise visibilir); [unction (NVF), defined by NVF = 1 -TMF. NVF values near zero indicate flat regions, where the watermark should be attcnuated, whilc NVF values near zero indicate texture or edge regions, where the watermark should be amplified. In this way, the watermark is embedded to resist estimation-based attacks derived from image denoising.
A qualitative comparison sheds light on the structure of watermarks produced in this manner. Figure 4a shows the original Cameraman image and the NVFs derived using the first and second cases, and Fig. 4b depicts the corresponding magnitude spectra. The figure clearly shows that the resulting watcrmark spectra are closely matched to the power spectrum of the original image. Note that for images, the PSC can givc only a coarse rcsult since the underlying statistical model does not fit very closely to images. Nevcrthcless, the results obtained using the PSC agree with those o l the NVF. 
AITACKS DEPENDENT ON LOCAL SIGNAL STATISTICS
Differcnt estimation-bascd attacks can successfully be comhined depending on local signal statistics. Hcre wc focus on imagc watermarking. The attacker is motivated to reduce the maximum rate of reliable communication also by exploiting the HVS and the possibility to remove thc watcrmark based on different models of the image. The watermark can easily be predicted and removed from flat image areas rather than from areas of edges and textures. The stochastic model for the edges and textures is nonstationary and rclatively complicated to use for accurate image estimation. Therefore, the attacker will try as much as possible to utilize the advantages of denoising and remove thc watermark from flat areas without visual distortions and even enhancing t h e PSNR. I n contrast, the attacker will use remodulation with incrcascd strength in the edges and texture areas, which again will he masked by thc HVS. At the samc time, the attacker can use the NVF to automatically determine the flat regions, edges, and textures. This attack is schcmatically shown in 
OPTIMIZED ATTACKS
So far, we have developed differcnt attacks based on watermark estimation and discussed how an embedder can make watermark estimation as difficult as possible. Howevcr, the cmbedder has another chance to react to estimationbased attacks, especially to the remodulation attack. T h e detector can first estimate the remodulatcd watermark and try to invcrt the remodulation, and thus retain reliable waterinark detection. For instance, when watermark estimation is based on Wiener filtering, the detector can apply inverse Wiener filtering. This is of course not wanted by the attacker. Thus, heishe has to add noise to the attacked data, which would be amplified by the inverse Wiener filtering and thus impair watermark detection. Of course, the additive noise further degrades the attacked signal. Now, we have the situation where the attacker has to find a good combination of using the cstimatcd watermark and the noise to bc added. The embedder no longer simply tries to make watermark estimation as hard as possible, howcvcr; he .also has to get a power advantage over the additive noise an attacker might introduce. This problem can b e Eormulatcd in a n even more gcncral way: the attackcr attempts to minimize the watermark capacity under a constraint o n t h e distortions introduced by the attack. The embedder attempts to maximize the watermark capacity under a constraint on the embedding distortions. This situation can be regarded as a game between the attacker and embedder. To solve this problem, we followed a game-thcorctic approach, assuming that the We consider the scenario where the original signal and watermark are drawn from independent, zero-mean, stationary, colored Gaussian random proccsses. In this case a solution to the described game can be found. It appears that the optimal watermark power allocation for reliable watermarking is dependent on the amount of distortion that can be introduced by an attacker. At low distortion levels, white watermarks perform near optimally, while at high distortion, PSC-compliant watermarks are more appropriate. Watermarks embedded into signal components with low variance (e.g., high frequencies or flat regions in images) will be filtered out by the optimized attacks, while watermarks embedded into signal components with high variance are more efficiently disturbed by additive noise. To apply these results to real-world watermarking applications, good signal decompositions have to be used to separate signal components with different statistics. For images, wavelet decompositon might be a good choice. However, research in this direction is still inconclusive.
BENCHMARKING
In this section we present three benchmarking initiatives for image watermarking schemes: Stirmark [l], a benchmark including cstimationbased attacks as proposed in [5] , and the current Certimdrk initiative.
STIRMARK
The Stirmark benchmark [ I ] divides attacks into t h e following nine categories: signal enhancement, compression, scaling, cropping, shearing, rotation, linear transformations, other geometric transformations, and random geometric distortions. In the case of signal scaling, cropping, shearing, rotation, linear transformations, and other geometric transformations, the attacked images are obtained with and without JPEG 90 percent quality factor compression. In order to produce a score relative to the benchmark, a score of 1 is assigned when the watermark is decoded and 0 when it is not decoded. The average is then computed for each category, and the average of the results is computcd t o obtain an overall score. T h e benchmark should also he averaged over several imagcs. In order to ensure a fair comparison, Petitcolas suggests imposing a minimum PSNR of 38 d B for the watermarked image. However, this constraint is questionable since PSNR is not a meaningful measurement in the context of geometric distortions.
A BENCHMARK INCLUDING ESTIMATION-BASED AITACKS
While the Stirmark benchmark is an excellent tool for measuring the robustness of watermarking algorithms, it is heavily weighted toward geometric transformations, which d o not take into account prior information about the watermark. Therefore, another benchmark was proposed [ anothcr image. If the watermark is successfully detected in the new image, the algorithm has failed. Template removal followed by small rotation. 9 Compression based on wavelet decomposition of t h e image, which is superior to JPEG compression a n d is integrated to rcflcct the f u t u r e a p p e a r a n c e of t h e JPEG2000 standard. Also included in this benchmark is a new proposal for evaluating image quality. Rather than using PSNR, two approaches based on wcighted PSNK and Watson's metric arc proposcd. The Watson mctric mcasurcs local image characteristics and reflects luminance, contrast, and texture masking.
CERTI MARK
The lack of officially acccptcd benchmarking tools fastered the launch of the European project Certimark (Certification for watcrmarking techniques) that started in May 2000. The project includes 15 academic and industrial partners. The objectives of Certimark are:
To design, develop, and publish a complete benchmark suitc for watermarking technologies within promising application sccnarios To make this benchmark suite a reference tool for tcchnology suppliers and technology customers within promising applications scenarios 9 To set up a certification process for watermarking algorithms T o concentrate rcscarch o n pending key issues in watcrmarking for protection of still images and low-bit-rate video over the Interiict The aim of Certimark, based on the benchmark reference, is to make watermarking algorithms labeled with an international certification. This certification process and award will be conductcd by a major international rights holder representative. Benchmarking, lcading to an internationally recognized reference, will permit customers to assess the appropriateness of a given watermarking tcchnology for their needs. Assessment of technologics in a clear framcwork will allow competition between technology suppliers while maintaining a given quality standard measured by thc benchmark. In summary, the originality and cmphasis of the project will bc on the parallel development of okjecLive evaluation tools and robust watermarking techniques to bc ccrtified in order to win the confdencc of content providers.
CONCLUSIONS
Attacks on digital watermarking systems are investigated in this article. First, a categorization of different attacks is given, and popular attacks are briefly described. We point out that attacks on digital watermarks must consider both watermark survival and the distortion of the attacked document. Early attacks do not exploit as much knowledge of the watcrmarking scheme as possible; also, they do not consider the distortion of the attacked document. Sincc attacks can be improved by using knowlcdge of the watermarking schcme and the signal statistics, wc describe a new set of attacks called estimation-bascd attacks. The general idea is to cstimate the watermark and exploit it to trick the detector. It is shown that this approach is related to dcnoising, but can bc cxtcndcd to a variety of different attack mcthods. Next we describe how an embeddcr can try to resist estimation bascd attacks, which leads to thc conccpt of PSC-compliant watcrmarks o r watermarks adapted to thc NVF, depending on the application and signal model at hand. Finally, we explain how considering the watermarking and attacking problem as a game between embedder and attacker can be exploited to find the watermark capacity, when facing an optimized attack with a constrained attack distortion. The theoretical analysis of watermark attacks gives many insight into the watermarking problem, and enables us to show fundamcutal limits of this tcchnology. However, theory does not render benchmarks of practical watermarking algorithms useless. On the contrary, both concepts complement each other. Therefore, wc dcscribcd and compared some recent watcrmark benchmark initiatives in thc last part of the article. The electronic medium allows rapid publication of up-to date survey articles a n d the capability of electronic searching.
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